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ABSTRACT 
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio 
Treaty, is one of the Organization of American States’ (OAS) founding agreements. The 
treaty includes language that provides for collective hemispheric defense, and it has been 
invoked on multiple occasions. However, Rio Treaty invocations have consistently 
struggled to generate salient multilateral security cooperation. This thesis hypothesizes, 
and finds, that the Rio Treaty has been unsuccessful at producing meaningful security 
cooperation because of repeated misuse by its signatories. To prove the hypothesis, this 
thesis examines OAS involvement in two regional crises, the 1965 Dominican Civil War 
and the Falklands/Malvinas War, in search of common themes. In both cases, a treaty 
signatory executed a fait accompli and then turned to the OAS in need of international 
legitimacy rather than strategic need. During the Dominican Civil War, the Rio Treaty 
was not invoked when it likely should have been. As a result, the Inter-American Peace 
Force (IAPF), which the OAS dispatched in response to the crisis, would remain forever 
unformalized. Argentina misused the Rio Treaty by invoking it after it had to face the 
military consequences of a conflict that it instigated with Great Britain. The vastly 
different OAS response to each case can be explained by vested U.S. interest in each 
conflict.
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
By examining different instances of regional conflict this thesis will explore why 
the Rio Treaty has failed to produce meaningful security cooperation among its signatories. 
Additionally, how did those invocations affect the salience of the treaty? 
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA), more commonly 
known as the Rio Treaty, Rio Pact, or by its Spanish acronym TIAR, is a mutual defense 
pact between nineteen members of the Organization of American States (OAS).1 Signed 
in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro, it represents the culmination of many years of limited 
hemispheric cooperation dating back to the mid-19th century.2 For the United States, a 
hemispheric collective defense treaty provided a mechanism with which to prevent the 
spread of communism into the Western Hemisphere. For Latin America, the treaty 
provided a mechanism to balance against U.S. influence in regional affairs.3 
The Rio Treaty remains in effect today; however, the end of the Cold War and the 
emergence of alternative sub regional institutions have called the Rio Treaty’s relevance 
into question. Despite coming into existence around the same time as other multilateral 
defense organizations, most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
Rio Treaty has always appeared less salient and as even seen the withdrawal of multiple 
states since the early 2000s including Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.4 
 
1 Nineteen of thirty five OAS member states are party to the Rio Treaty: these include: Argentina, the 
Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Note that Uruguay denounced the treaty in 2019 and will no longer be a signatory in 2021 and 
that Venezuela’s re-accession was initiated by Juan Guaido’s interim government, not the Maduro 
government in Caracas. Organization of American States, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
(Rio Treaty) (Rio de Janiero: Organization of American States, 1947), https://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/sigs/b-29.html. 
2 Francisco V. Garcia-Amador, “The Rio De Janeiro Treaty: Genesis, Development, and Decline of a 
Regional System of Collective Security,” The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 17, no. 1 
(1985): 32. 
3 Peter Smith, “Closing Ranks,” in Talons of the Eagle, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 124. 
4 Organization of American States, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
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Since 1947, the Rio Treaty has been invoked on seven separate occasions for a 
variety of reasons including territorial incursions, terrorism, and foreign intervention (see 
Table 1).5 Another thirteen regional disputes prompted security related meetings at the 
OAS but fell short of treaty invocation. It has been successful at deescalating conflicts 
between member states but its more notable failures include building hemispheric support 
for multilateral action in the Korean War, the Falklands/Malvinas War, and the Global War 
on Terrorism launched following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Rio Treaty was most 
recently invoked in 2019 in response to the worsening humanitarian crisis in Venezuela 
resulting in targeted multilateral sanctions against the Maduro regime as well as Uruguay’s 
withdrawal from the agreement over concerns that the use of the Rio Treaty constituted the 
first steps toward military intervention.6 This recent case seems to be an additional instance 
of treaty misapplication, which fits within a larger pattern that has gradually eroded its 
legitimacy. 
Table 1. Meetings of Consultation Called in Response to Security Threats 
Year Meeting of  




Subject Notable Results 
1951 IV No International Communist Aggression 
(Korean War) 
Bilateral cooperation 
1959 V No Caribbean Unrest (Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Venezuela) 
 
1960 VI/VII Yes Dominican Aggression in Venezuela 
(Betancourt assassination attempt) 
Diplomatic ties 
severed 
1962 VIII Yes Cuban/Communist Aggression Cuba excluded from 
OAS 
1964 IX Yes Cuban Aggression in Venezuela  
1964 X No Dominican Civil War Creation of IAPF 
1967 XI No Alliance for Progress Expansion  
1967 XII No Cuban Aggression in Venezuela  
1969 XIII No Honduras/ El Salvador (Football War)  
1971 XIV No US/ Ecuador Fishing Dispute  
1974 XV No Cuban Relations Debate  
1975 XVI No Cuban Relations Partial Restoration  
1978 XVII/XVIII Yes Costa Rica/ Nicaragua Border Dispute  
 
5 Peter Meyer, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Crisis in Venezuela, CRS 
Report No. IN11116 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
row/IN11116.pdf. 
6 Organization of American States, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
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Year Meeting of  




Subject Notable Results 
1981 XIX No Peru/ Ecuador Dispute  
1982 XX Yes Falklands/Malvinas Dispute U.S. defies Rio Treaty 
resolutions 
1989 XXI No Panama Intervention  
1992 XXII No Regional Militarism (did not meet)  
2001 XXIII/XXIV Yes 9/11 terrorist attacks Mexico leaves Rio 
Treaty 
2008 XXV No Colombian pursuit of FARC into Ecuador  
2019 XXX Yes Venezuelan Crisis  Uruguay leaves Rio 
Treaty 
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
By examining regional conflicts that prompted OAS consultation, some of which 
resulted in invocations of the Rio Treaty, I hope to find common themes that could be 
useful in determining the Rio Treaty’s future relevance. Can the U.S. count on its 
hemispheric treaty partners in the new era of great power competition? Conversely, can the 
rest of Latin America count on one another along with the United States to uphold its 
commitment to collective defense? 
Examples from the past could shed light on how, or if, the Rio Treaty can be used 
to solve regional issues going forward. The crisis in Venezuela provides an especially 
timely example of the Rio Treaty in action. Venezuela’s implosion is also interesting 
because Venezuela was part of the largest single exodus from the treaty in 2012 along with 
fellow ALBA members Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua.7 So far, OAS sanctions against 
the Maduro Regime have made little progress but it will be interesting to see if Bolivia and 
Ecuador follow Juan Guido’s lead and return to the defense pact in the wake of the Morales 
and Correa presidencies.8 
Along the way, I hope to shed some light on several additional questions: what 
common threads exist between regional conflicts where the OAS consultations processes 
failed to produce multilateral action. How did those failures affect the Rio Treaty’s 
 
7 Organization of American States. 
8 Meyer, The Inter-American Treaty. 
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legitimacy? Conversely, when the OAS was successful in prompting collective action, 
what factors contributed to finding consensus?  
As China and Russia continue to build influence in the Western Hemisphere, can 
the United States rely on its regional allies in the event of a future world conflict? This 
thesis hopes to help determine whether the Rio Treaty still matters. If it does, then this 
thesis will hopefully help shape policy to keep the treaty relevant. If the Rio Treaty has 
ceased to matter, then maybe this thesis can help guide policy makers toward the 
construction a better agreement.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Rio Treaty is one piece of a complicated institutional web that make up the 
Inter-American Security System. Despite some of the criticism that the Rio Treaty receives 
it continues to exist; however, parties to the treaty have frequently elected to approach 
security issues through bilateral and ad hoc mechanisms when challenges arise. Over time 
U.S. unilateralism has helped to undermine the system’s institutions and the end of the 
Cold War has caused an ever-widening rift between Latin American and U.S. security 
interests. Newer sub-regional institutions have emerged alongside the OAS and the Rio 
Treaty with significant responsibility overlap.  
1. Evolution of the Security System 
When considering the Rio Treaty’s effectiveness, it is important to discuss its 
historical development. John Child, for one, provides a very comprehensive analysis of 
hemispheric security since WWII in his book Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American 
Military System, 1938–1978. He argues that mismatched perceptions of threat and security 
prevented the OAS from adopting a concrete multilateral military institution. Instead, the 
Rio Treaty serves as multilateral cover for primarily bilateral military cooperation that 
seems to be preferred by all parties involved. He breaks his analysis into four eras during 
which the Inter-American Military System experience growth, decline, rebirth, and 
5 
fragmentation.9 He also makes the interesting observation that despite the military 
impotence of the Inter-American Military System, its symbolic value has helped it to 
survive for decades on end with seemingly little purpose.10 Child argues that the Inter-
American Military System was conceived in the context of the Second World War and that 
its accidental initial impotence was later purposely prevented by its participants from 
developing a multilateral military component.11 A competing view from Francisco Garcia-
Amador traces the origins of the Rio Treaty to the Panama Congress of  1826 and the Treaty 
of Perpetual Union.12 The principal of Pan-American Solidarity and explicit definitions of 
aggression which emerged in later 19th century treaties provided the rational for tangible 
cooperation against external threats.13 He argues that instances of misapplication, non-
application, and non-compliance with provisions of the Rio Treaty have eroded its 
effectiveness over time.14 Garcia-Amador’s argument is more convincing because treaty 
misapplication has likely contributed to treaty signatories lack of desire to formally 
militarize the OAS. 
Lack of meaningful security cooperation could also be explained by the pacific 
nature of international relations in Western Hemisphere. In Zones of Peace, Arie Kacowicz 
provides an examination of the factors that explain the lasting peace, which has prevailed 
in South America since the late 1800s. Kacowicz describes peace in terms of three levels 
that evolve from one another. These levels include negative peace, which is the simple 
absence of conflict. Stable Peace is based on “reciprocal and consensual” satisfaction with 
socio-economic and territorial status quo among neighbors that renders armed conflict 
practically unthinkable. Lastly, a Pluralistic Security Community is the pinnacle of Stable 
Peace where interdependence and common identity provide “stable expectations for 
 
9 John Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938–1978, A Westview 
Replica Edition (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1980), 1–3. 
10 Child, 234. 
11 Child, 235. 
12 Garcia-Amador, “The Rio De Janeiro Treaty,” 2. 
13 Garcia-Amador, 4. 
14 Garcia-Amador, 42. 
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peaceful change.”15 Kacowicz also lays out nine factors, which contribute to the 
development, perpetuation, and evolution of peace. These factors include the presence of 
a systemic hegemon; a regional balance of power; a common threat; geographic or 
institutional obstacles to conflict including military impotence; democratic governments; 
economic prosperity; deep integration on multiple levels; a normative consensus regarding 
international law and conflict resolution; and territorial satisfaction.16 His analysis 
suggests that the confluence of these conditions has contributed to lasting peace in South 
America and even the emergence of a Pluralistic Security Community between some South 
American States. While his analysis is limited to South America his nine factors seem to 
exist elsewhere within the Inter-American System and the argument could be made that a 
condition of negative peace has emerged throughout the Western Hemisphere with the aid 
of institutions like the OAS, which includes the Rio Treaty. 
David Mares contests the assumption that Latin America represents a zone of 
negative or pluralistic peace.17 Countries are not as territorially satisfied as Kacowicz 
argues and that the principle of uti possidetis should not be counted on because colonial 
borders are poorly drawn, poorly documented, and in some cases remain ambiguous.18 He 
points to multiple simmering border disputes across the region, a few of which have 
resulted in violent confrontation. He admits that interstate conflicts typically remain 
localized, but he points to a larger pattern of dispute militarization that normally stops short 
of war. Regional institutions have created a “moral hazard” and may contribute to this 
pattern by their ability to successfully deescalate disputes and lower the risks associated 
with militarization.19 This argument goes further in explaining Rio Treaty ineffectiveness 
 
15 Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in 
Comparative Perspective, SUNY Series in Global Politics (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1998), 9–10. 
16 Kacowicz, 5–6. 
17 David Mares, “Interstate Disputes: Militarized Coercion and ‘Peaceful Settlement,’” in Routledge 
Handbook of Latin American Security, ed. Arie M. Kacowicz and David Mares (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 254, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315867908. 
18 Mares, 262. 
19 Mares, 259. 
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because it paints a picture of an alliance structure where members present credible threats 
to one another preventing meaningful and lasting integration.  
2. Alliance Structures and Institutional Order 
When considering security agreements like the Rio Treaty it is important to 
examine what alliances do, why they are formed, and how they work. They are notoriously 
difficult to manage, are often fragile, and are yet seemingly indispensable. This section will 
discuss alliances from realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives and how each school 
provides meaningful explanations for alliances. It will also briefly approach the topic of 
inter alliance dynamics.  
In Origins of Alliances, Stephen Walt lays out a series of hypotheses for the 
successful creation of alliances that fit a primarily realist perspective of international 
competition caused by systemic anarchy. Walt theorizes that states will either form 
coalitions to “balance against a threatening power,” or they will bandwagon with the most 
threatening state within the system. He also theorizes that ideology and foreign aid provide 
weak motivation to form alliances.20 Walt’s Balance of Threat theory fits nicely with 
Child’s description of the bilateral nature of Inter-American Military System described in 
Unequal Alliance. More simply, the conditions do not exist within Western Hemisphere 
that would facilitate the formation of a serious security pact. It therefore should be no 
surprise that the one that exists feels forced and has often proved ineffective.  
From a liberal perspective, John Ikenberry describes the process in which victorious 
states design world orders in the wake of large conflicts. He argues that the institutional 
order that was set up and led by the United States after WWII is quite durable and has 
achieved wide scale participation. Significant power disparity and durable institutions, 
which encourage strategic restraint have amplified U.S. power over time.21 The Rio Treaty 
and the overarching Inter-American Security System provide an interesting regional 
 
20 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 5, 
ProQuest. 
21 John G. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars, New Edition (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019), xi–xvi. 
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example of this framework. Despite accusations of impotence, it could be argued that the 
institutional framework, which makes up the Inter-American Security System has helped 
facilitate a relatively stable condition of hemispheric peace. Excepting a few instances of 
U.S. unilateralism, the system has helped deescalate numerous disputes from turning to 
armed conflict. According to this train of thought, the system itself should be considered 
effective, not impotent because it has prevented the need to form a multilateral military 
coalition.  
The OAS and its associated security elements are one of many international 
institutions, which the United States helped to build and has actively participated within. It 
provides a binding vehicle through which some Kacowicz’s peace factors can manifest 
themselves, particularly regional integration, and the commitment to international law. As 
Kacowicz argues, regional democratization and a common cultural predisposition toward 
the adherence to international law and institutional norms seem to have developed a 
complicated but effective means to achieve mostly peaceful interaction between American 
states.22 
Kacowicz draws from the work of Karl Deutsch who explains how integration is 
central to the formation of security communities. Strong and competent governments that 
show responsiveness to the desires of neighbors, the presence of supranational institutions, 
and the freedom of movement between countries all greatly contribute to the development 
of integration.23 He goes on to say that durable military alliances can form as a result of 
integration however military alliance is poor way to encourage integration.24 Along these 
lines, a competing liberal explanation for Rio Treaty impotence could be the result of 
building a treaty before sufficient levels of regional integration were achieved.  
Constructivism posits that alliances, or multilateral institutions, form as a 
mechanism through which states can transmit norms and ideas through socialized 
 
22 Kacowicz, Zones of Peace, 116–24. 
23 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North American Area (Princeton University Press, 
1957), 200–201. 
24 Deutsch, 202. 
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interaction.25 It could be argued that the Rio Treaty and greater Inter-American Security 
system evolved out of realist, material concerns about extra hemispheric invasion via South 
America during WWII. With the war squarely in the rearview, collective security was 
institutionalized and became a mechanism with which the United States used to promote 
capitalist and democratic ideals to keep Latin American countries within the western sphere 
of influence. Conversely, the OAS became a mechanism for Latin American nations to 
collectively promote their beliefs in sovereignty to the United States through interaction. 
Results were not immediate: the U.S. engaged in unilateral interventionism until 1990 and 
Latin America took a few decades to re-democratize. But, from a longer-term view, the 
region is overwhelmingly democratic, and the U.S. is unlikely to return to its 20th century 
interventionist tendencies.  
Alliances are an effective means to enhance material power through collective 
means. However, they can be cumbersome and difficult to manage especially as they grow 
and as threats evolve or disappear.26 Wallace Thies describes how some burden sharing 
friction is destined to emerge as members constantly struggle to find their own appropriate 
guns to butter ratio in the hope of reducing their own alliance associated costs as much as 
possible while simultaneously trying to convince partners to do more. He also discusses 
the concept of substitutability, in which military assets can be effectively substituted 
amongst partners.27 Burden sharing and substitutability both provide challenges for the 
Inter-American Security System as smaller, less capable Latin American militaries are 
unlikely to be substitutable for U.S. military assets. It makes sense that Latin American 
nations, which have limited resources, large social programs, and no shortage of negative 
historical experience with military rule would be reluctant to invest in defense. But the 
system sort of works because Latin American countries are willing to lend their 
 
25 Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation,” Security Studies 8, 
no. 2–3 (1998): 211, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419808429378. 
26 Patricia Weitsman, “Introduction,” in Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of 
Interstate Violence (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 5, https://doi.org/10.1515/
9780804788946. 
27 Wallace Thies, “Introduction,” in Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (New 
York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2002), 6–15, ProQuest. 
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participation, which provides legitimacy28 for the institution and in return they receive 
some level of protection under the U.S. security umbrella.  
3. Evolving Perceptions of Threat and Security 
Alliances form when nations team up to hedge against threats. For half a century, 
from about 1940–1990, hemispheric threats were relatively well defined. According to 
Child, the multilateral dimension of the Inter-American Security System peaked during 
WWII when Axis expansionism provided a very clear and credible threat of potential extra 
hemispheric aggression. After the war, Soviet communism replaced the Axis expansion as 
the prevailing external threat to the region, which would eventually manifest itself in Cuban 
style revolution.29 Meanwhile, from the perspective of many Latin American nations, with 
the Nazi threat neutralized, the United States resumed its position as the most powerful and 
proximate threat to their sovereignty.30 For the countries of Latin America, the 
militarization of the OAS via the Rio Treaty would create more threats than it was designed 
to discourage.  
From an ideological perspective, the U.S. was interested in creating a coalition 
rooted in capitalist, or at least anti-communist, ideals. Walt points out that ideological 
alliances are often fragile.31 According to this line of thought, the ideological commitment 
to capitalism, or at least the commitment to anticommunism, may not provide a solid 
foundation for meaningful security cooperation especially when the governments involved 
have varied considerably in their democratic and autocratic orientations.  
Walt goes on to explain that foreign aid is not a particularly effective means of 
gaining influence nor does it constitute a solid base for coalition building.32 Throughout 
the 20th century, Washington did not share Latin American views on the socio economic 
 
28 Keohane describes the concept of legitimacy as “the right to rule” coupled with the willing 
participation of the ruled who widely believe in that right. Robert Keohane, “Global Governance and 
Legitimacy,” Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 1 (2011): 99–109. 
29 Child, Unequal Alliance, 234. 
30 Child, 71. 
31 Walt, The Origins, 33–40. 
32 Walt, 43. 
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and developmental aspects of security instead focusing resources primarily toward military 
security. A recurring theme that Child points out over the 40-year period covered in his 
book is how most Latin-U.S. security cooperation was predicated on the availability of 
American military aid. The U.S. wanted to monopolize the supply of arms to Latin America 
as well as provide training to standardize hemispheric military doctrine.33 This 
perpetuation of military dependence would serve multiple purposes: buy influence with 
Latin American governments while simultaneously preventing the emergence of European 
or Soviet military influence. Regional standardization would also serve to improve 
substitutability within the Inter-American Security System. In practice however, global and 
domestic context continuously prevented the U.S. from providing Latin America with the 
desired quantities of military aid causing them to turn to other suppliers as well as their 
own domestic production of arms.34 It would appear that influence and cooperation 
obtained through military aid only lasted as long as the aid was forthcoming. In some 
circumstances the military dependence cultivated by the United States proved 
counterproductive as the conditions which it brought began to be seen as interventionist.35 
This fits nicely with David Mare’s description of current U.S. influence on Latin American 
security: a state of “neo-dependency,” based on volatile external stimuli in which U.S. 
influence is directly proportional to economic need in relation to prevailing threat 
environment.36 
Walt’s framework for alliance formation provides an interesting paradox when 
examining the Inter-American Security System. The Rio Treaty provides a mechanism to 
bandwagon Latin America with the victorious United States in the wake of WWII to 
balance against potential extra hemispheric threats. However, in accordance with the 
 
33 Child, Unequal Alliance, 71–85. 
34 By domestic and global context I am referring to the demands of other overseas conflicts including 
WWII Lend Lease, Korea, Vietnam, as well as U.S. State Department and Congressional resistance to 
military diplomacy, and the eventual domestic resistance to the support of dictatorships. Child, 197. 
35 Child, 206. 
36 David Mares, “The United States’ Impact on Latin America’s Security Environment: The 
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Balance of Threat theory the countries of Latin America should naturally coalesce to 
balance against the United States. Instead, what appears to have emerged is balancing 
behavior within an unnaturally bandwagoned institution. Despite the unnatural and shaky 
foundation, it would appear that hemispheric institutions have provided a venue for Latin 
American nations to soft balance against overbearing U.S. influence. According to Max 
Friedman and Tom Long, soft balancing is a long-term diplomatic strategy, which occurs 
in unipolar systems in response to perceived power and the fear of its unilateral use.37 Soft 
balancing is a viable method for smaller states to exercise agency and collectively influence 
outcomes within a heavily biased system. 
The post Cold War era has yet to provide a credible threat alternative with the 
exception of Islamic extremism, which has manifested itself primarily against western 
Europe and the United States. Military action in the Global War on Terror has been directed 
primarily at Middle Eastern states, which generally maintain positive relationships with 
their Latin American counterparts. Meanwhile, the interventionist nature of the U.S. led 
Global War on Terror likely does not sit well with collective memory of Rio Treaty partners 
and provides a reasonable explanation for the region’s opposition to, or simply verbal 
support of, U.S. initiatives. 
Instead, threats to the region are primarily regionally and domestically based. 
Fedrico Merke suggests that Latin America’s greatest perceived threats are domestic failure 
and international marginalization.38 Cameron Thies points to persistent regional rivalries, 
which are central to national identities and that occasionally become militarized over 
tangible objectives like boundary disputes. Interestingly, Thies credits rivalry for being a 
state building mechanism similar to, but less effective than, war in the fashion of Charles 
Tilley.39 
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Several authors highlight institutional proliferation as an obstacle to Inter-
American cooperation. The OAS has come to exist alongside a number of different sub 
regional institutions including MERCOSUR, ALBA, CELAC, and UNASUR with its own 
security arm, the Security and Defense Council (SDC). This preponderance of multilateral 
institutions serves similar purposes and often experiences responsibility overlap. Malamud 
and Schenoni blame U.S. unilateralism as the primary factor undermining the legitimacy 
of the Rio Treaty and collective hemispheric security. As a result, most security 
cooperation takes place bilaterally via ad hoc agreements, which sometimes evolve into 
their own institutions.40 Along a similar line, Serbin and Serbin Pont account for 
institutional proliferation with the United States’ poor reputation for minimizing military 
surprise through its rule breaking behavior against treaty partners,41 which explains South 
American disillusionment with the OAS and the Rio Treaty.42 They go on to say that 
institutional proliferation is not necessarily bad, but that it is just an effective method for 
conflict resolution in the region. Friedman and Long point to institutional proliferation as 
another method of soft balancing, in which the United States is purposely excluded from 
the new sub regional institutions.43 Alternatively, Rodrigo Tavares argues that institutional 
overlap has developed from the OAS’ cumbersome process of consensus decision making 
and its unwavering position on the sanctity of sovereignty. He says that besides democratic 
stability and human security the region lacks any kind of coherent security policy, which 
in turn exacerbates institutional overlap. This overlap is detrimental because it can be 
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expensive, can cause additional competition, and it inhibits accountability.44 While smaller 
sub regional institutions are easier to manage, it is hard to believe that newer institutions 
with less participation will be able to achieve the legitimacy that the OAS has just from its 
own longevity and its capacity for improvement.45 
4. Conclusion 
Child and Kacowicz each provide a lot of excellent information regarding the 
development, functionality, and decline of the Inter-American Security System but their 
analyses hits some limits due to age. More modern scholarship focuses on the evolution of 
regional security since the end of the Cold War and suggests that U.S. and Latin American 
security interests remain distinct from one another; with U.S. focus on terrorism and great 
power conflict versus Latin America’s multi-dimensional focus on democratic and human 
security. Historically differing threat perspectives highlight the Rio Treaty’s shaky 
foundations and U.S. unilateralism, and institutional proliferation are common themes, 
which help explain its gradual erosion.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The Rio Treaty is an integral part of an unnatural and imbalanced hemispheric 
security system, which has been undermined over time by misapplication, poor execution, 
and divergent security interests. More simply, repeated misapplication of the Rio Treaty 
has contributed to the region’s divergent security interests and has and has inhibited 
meaningful security cooperation.  
Alliances are difficult to manage, especially when they are exceedingly one sided, 
like in the case of the Rio Treaty. The United States’ ability and willingness to act 
unilaterally invites Rio Treaty misapplication and contributes to the region’s divergent 
security perceptions. This in turn has served to validate strong Latin American views of 
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sovereignty and contributed to the continued divergence of threat perception. In instances 
where collective action occurred, poor execution may have soured future prospects for 
success. Other instances of nonintervention and inaction on the part of Rio Treaty 
signatories may suggest that the institutional transmission of norms between treaty partners 
has failed or remains incomplete.  
Alternatively, the Rio Treaty’s dearth of multilateral security cooperation may be a 
positive signal of its health. The conditions under which it came into existence, threat of 
extra hemispheric invasion, have yet to reemerge. Rio Treaty invocations may actually 
point to a messy but successful track record of multilateral de-escalation punctuated by 
occasional instances hegemonic unilateral action. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to study how misapplication and poor execution have contributed to tepid 
security cooperation through the Rio Treaty this thesis analyzes factors leading up to treaty 
invocation as well as the resulting security cooperation. The 1965 multilateral intervention 
in response to the Dominican Civil War as well as the lack of coordinated response to 
Falklands/Malvinas War provide examples of the region’s inability to effectively come 
together against collective threats.  
The 1965 intervention in the Dominican Civil War is notable because it is the only 
example of successful multilateral OAS security cooperation, however, that cooperation 
occurred without the use of the Rio Treaty.46 While the intervention was initially unilateral 
in nature, it prompted the OAS to establish the Inter-American Peace Force to assist in 
channeling the Dominican political process back toward a democratically elected, non-
communist leadership. Similarity exists between the Dominican case and the ongoing crisis 
in Venezuela. Interestingly, the spillover from the Venezuela crisis has softened some 
countries’ anathema for intervention as demonstrated by the OAS’ decision to conduct low 
level intervention in the form of sanctions against their rogue neighbor.  
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The Falklands/Malvinas War provides another interesting example of Rio Treaty 
breakdown. Britain’s moves to forcefully remove Argentine troops from the islands set the 
stage for the first, and only, instance of extra hemispheric aggression against an American 
state since the Rio Treaty’s creation. And yet, Argentina’s invocation of the Rio Treaty did 
not prompt a meaningful collective response. Most of Latin America was sympathetic to 
Argentina’s cause but they declined to offer much more that rhetoric on Argentina’s behalf. 
Meanwhile, the United States took the side of Great Britain and openly defied Rio Treaty 
resolutions by providing significant military aid to the British. Misapplication comes into 
play because in this conflict the aggressor is the party that invoked the treaty. Interestingly, 
this breakdown of the treaty did not prompt an exodus from the treaty by Argentina or 
anybody else.  
There are a few additional Rio Treaty invocations that, while interesting, are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The VI Meeting of Consultation in 1960 provides a good 
example of collective diplomatic action under Rio Treaty auspices. Venezuela called the 
meeting following a series of events in which it accused the Dominican Republic of 
organizing an overthrow of the Venezuelan government. The culminating, and most 
dramatic, event was a failed assassination attempt against Venezuelan President Romulo 
Betancourt. In response, the OAS conducted an investigation, which confirmed the 
accusations and directed its members to sever all diplomatic ties with the Trujillo regime.47 
In December of 1978, a meeting of consultation was convened under the Rio Treaty 
at Costa Rica’s request following a speech by Anastasio Samoza, Jr. in which he threatened 
to invade Costa Rica if more effective measures were not taken to inhibit the movement of 
Sandanista National Liberation Front (FSLN) guerillas that were operating across the Costa 
Rican border. The contentious relationship between Costa Rica and Nicaragua during the 
late 1970s is an interesting subject and one that draws many parallels to ongoing tension 
between Venezuela and its neighbors. But, following his speech, Somoza did not make 
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good on his threat and so no further OAS action besides a resolution urging restraint was 
required.48  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a meeting of consultation under the Rio Treaty 
to discuss appropriate regional responses to an act of aggression against the United 
States.49 This invocation resulted in tepid support from Latin America for the U.S. led War 
on Terror as well as Mexico’s subsequent withdrawal from the Rio Treaty. The complex 
nature of the Global War on Terror and the introduction of non-state aggressors warrants 
its own investigation that goes beyond this thesis.  
This thesis examines the causes and subsequent OAS responses to two Western 
Hemispheric conflicts in search of common themes that explain the lack of meaningful 
security cooperation under the Rio Treaty. The research shows that misapplication, among 
other things explain the impotence of the security pact. When viewed side by side, the 1965 
Dominican Crisis and the Falklands/Malvinas War illuminate two significant 
commonalities that point toward misapplication. First, in both cases the conflict’s aggressor 
retroactively turned to the Rio Treaty or the OAS Charter in search of legitimacy for a 
unilateral fait accompli. Second, collective action in response to each conflict was largely 
dependent on U.S. interest. Paradoxically, the 1965 Dominican Crisis, which resulted in 
meaningful OAS security cooperation, represented a misapplication of the Rio Treaty 
though its non-invocation. The circumstances under which the Inter-American Peace Force 
(IAPF) was born likely prevented its future formalization. Meanwhile, Argentina’s 
invocation of the Rio Treaty during the Falklands/Malvinas War was inappropriate and 
insincere. Argentina’s poorly executed miscalculation failed to inspire collective defense 
and created a situation where the United States felt compelled to side with its oldest ally 
and against OAS resolutions.  
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These misapplications did lasting damage to the Rio Treaty because both cases 
established a precedent by which the OAS became a vehicle to legitimize unilateral action. 
Additionally, both cases also did little to mitigate notions that a militarized OAS would be 
anything more than a U.S. proxy. Restoring the Rio Treaty’s relevance is possible, but it 
will take time and effort. To accomplish this, all treaty signatories should refrain from using 
to pact to legitimize unilateral action and should refrain from using the treaty to facilitate 
interventionist regime change without unanimous OAS. In the meantime, Rio Treaty 
partners should try to take collective action against less politically difficult hemispheric 
threats like Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). This thesis opens the door for 
further study on ways in which the United States and Latin America can try to reconcile 
their security interests as much as possible to improve hemispheric solidarity in a new 
bipolar world. 
19 
II. THE TENTH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE 
1965 DOMINICAN CIVIL WAR 
The 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers was convened on April 29, 1965, in 
response to escalating political violence in the Dominican Republic. It provides an 
especially interesting case study for this project because it is the only example of kinetic, 
multilateral security cooperation conducted under OAS auspices. The conflict brought 
about the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), a multilateral peacekeeping 
force, whose mission was largely a success, and yet did not result in its formalization nor 
the formalization of any other official security organ in the OAS. This failure can be 
attributed to several reasons, principally the United States’ swift and overwhelming 
unilateral action at the beginning of the conflict, which short circuited the OAS 
consultation process. Instead of creating a moment for hemispheric solidarity and 
collective action, the OAS took on a confused role of blunting U.S. interventionism while 
simultaneously providing legitimacy for those same actions. 
The Johnson Administration’s publicized justification for the intervention was 
initially based on a perceived need to evacuate American citizens in Santo Domingo.50 
This justification was expanded to include the prevention of communist takeover shortly 
after as a significantly larger American force touched down in Santo Domingo. Despite 
these assertions, the Johnson Administration struggled to manage its messaging about its 
actions to the media creating a “credibility gap.”51 This gap was exacerbated in large part 
by the administration’s inability to provide evidence of communist influence. While the 
original landing force did take steps to protect American citizens, they also disrupted the 
momentum of the Constitutionalist revolutionaries and there was hope amongst Johnson’s 
cabinet that the limited marine landing would help channel the conflict’s outcome toward 
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a resolution that they viewed to be in U.S. interests.52 According to some historical 
accounts, the actions of U.S. diplomatic staff perpetuated the radicalization of the rebel 
leadership. U.S. actions came as a surprise to the international community and, for many 
Latin American leaders, signaled the end of President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Era. In 
addition to signaling an end to the Good Neighbor Era, the Dominican intervention turned 
out to be first instance in a larger pattern of interventions that seemed to interrupt Latin 
American democratic self-corrections in places like Haiti and Honduras. Operationally, the 
IAPF functioned well considering its diverse nature; however, the preponderance of U.S. 
forces and its command structure provided the U.S. with outsized influence over it.53 
Significant U.S. military logistics support, which had to be provided to the Latin American 
contingents of the IAPF likely helped to perpetuate Department of Defense reluctance to 
collaborate with Latin American militaries on a more multilateral basis going forward.54 
Perhaps the most interesting part about this case is the fact that it produced a multilateral 
military force under the command of the OAS, but this force came into existence without 
the Rio Treaty.55 Instead, the U.S. turned to a loose interpretation of Articles 39 of the 
OAS charter in search of international approval for its actions. The correct way to have 
approached the problem would have likely been through an Organ of Consultation called 
under the Rio Treaty. However, U.S. diplomats were savvy enough to realize that an appeal 
to the Rio Treaty seeking approval to intervene in the Dominican Republic would likely 
have been unsuccessful.56 This is not to say that the U.S. would not have taken unilateral 
action without OAS approval, but in either case the incident provided stark example of how 
the OAS and the Rio Treaty were ineffective and constraining U.S. interventionism. For 
the Latin American members of the OAS, the end result of the entire affair was the one-
 
52 Yates, 182. 
53 Bruce Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989), 
73, ProQuest. 
54 Child, Unequal Alliance, 125. 
55 Ball, The OAS in Transition, 471. 
56 Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution, 1st 
ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 78. 
21 
time creation of an OAS military arm, which only justified their past reluctance to 
militarize the OAS.57  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Dominican Republic spent thirty years under the oppressive rule of General 
Rafael Trujillo who enjoyed long time support of the U.S. for his strong anticommunist 
stance. His reign of terror ended with his assassination in 1961 and a caretaker government 
was eventually established to organize elections following his death. A charismatic author, 
Juan Bosch, who had gone into exile after condemning Trujillo’s massacre of 15,000 
Haitian migrants in 1937,58 was elected on a left-of-center reform ticket in what were the 
Dominican Republic’s first free elections in decades. Bosch enjoyed support from the 
Kennedy Administration as well as working class Dominicans who had been previously 
excluded from political participation.59 
However, the Dominican Republic’s Democratic roots would prove shallow. Bosch 
only lasted seven months in office before he was overthrown by a praetorian military 
establishment frustrated by his soft stance against communism.60 The military set up a 
civilian junta dominated by conservative politicians that would prove unpopular and 
struggle to establish its legitimacy.61 The junta, led by Donald Reid Cabral, came to power 
amidst an economic slump driven by low commodity prices along with a heavily indebted 
government. His Triumvirate attempted to implement an austerity program “to tighten 
credit in order to limit imports” and balance the country’s payments position.62  These 
measures made life for Dominicans of all classes more difficult and made no one happy 
besides the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had insisted on their imposition. His 
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moves against military corruption eroded his support amongst senior military officers; 
however, this crackdown proved to be too lenient for certain sectors of more junior military 
personnel who felt that military reform would be impossible without a leadership reset.63 
These sentiments among frustrated working class Dominicans and disaffected members of 
the military prompted another coup in April of 1965.64 The rebel military units arrested 
President Reid at the national palace and demanded the return of Bosch along with the 
reformed 1963 constitution.65 These rebels, known as the “Constitutionalists” installed 
Jose Rafael Molina Ureña, the former Speaker of the House, as interim president until 
Bosch could return from exile in Puerto Rico, which would not occur until September of 
1965. The next day, the military’s conservative old guard responded, moving to suppress 
the rebellion. Troops under the command of conservative “Loyalist” generals moved out 
from their stronghold, the San Isidro Air Base, and advanced toward Santo Domingo where 
they stopped at the outskirts of town while air force planes bombarded the Presidential 
Palace.66 
The Constitutionalist rebels obtained weapons from military armories and 
expanded their forces by distributing weapons to civilians in Santo Domingo.67 Law and 
order quickly broke down in the city as a military stalemate developed with 
Constitutionalist rebels solidifying control of downtown Santo Domingo.68 During the 
early stages of the uprising, representatives from both sides approached the U.S. Embassy 
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seeking U.S. assistance to bring an end to the conflict.69 The U.S. embassy rebuffed these 
requests until the Constitutionalists began to gain the upper hand and rumors had surfaced 
that Castro-Communist elements were leading their movement.70 The next call for U.S. 
support from the Loyalist faction, which specifically stated their inability to protect 
American lives and property, prompted Ambassador William Tapley Bennett to formally 
request U.S. military assistance from Washington. A contingent of about 500 marines were 
landed and they succeeded in securing the U.S. Embassy and the Hotel Embajador on the 
western edge of Santo Domingo that would be used as an evacuation zone.71 
Back in Washington, the OAS convened an emergency Meeting of Consultation 
under Article 39 of the OAS Charter to address the ongoing crisis in Santo Domingo.72 
The meeting lasted all night and resolved to call for a ceasefire, the dispatch of a fact-
finding committee, and the establishment of a security zone.73 As the OAS meeting 
progressed, Johnson administration officials were developing contingency plans based on 
the deteriorating reports coming from the embassy in Santo Domingo. Drawing on 
experience from the Bay of Pigs a few years earlier, Johnson made the decision to mobilize 
the 82nd Airborne and position it so that “there would be enough troops in Santo Domingo 
to deal with any foreseeable eventuality.”74 During the early hours of Friday morning, 
minutes after the conclusion of the OAS’ meeting of consultation, some 20,000 soldiers 
from the 82nd Airborne landed at San Isidro to help reestablish order and prevent the 
Dominican Republic from falling into the hands of Castro-Communist revolutionaries.75 
Following the controversial landing of the 82nd, the OAS reconvened and within a 
few days resolved to create a multilateral Inter-American Peace Force to assume peace 
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keeping responsibilities in the Dominican Republic, which would permit a significant 
reduction of U.S. troops.76 The 1,700-man IAPF was comprised of primarily Brazilian 
troops as well as token contingents from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
and Paraguay.77 The composition of the IAPF says a lot about international support for the 
U.S. intervention. All of the coalition’s governments, with the exception of Costa Rica’s, 
were conservative dictatorships in which the military either ruled the country or held 
significant power.78 The Brazilian and Salvadorean governments had just recently come 
to power under similar circumstances to that of the Dominican Triumvirate, where 
concerned military officers wrested power from an elected president that was judged to be 
too soft on communists. The Brazilian military was Latin America’s most capable at the 
time and had previous collaborative combat experience working with the U.S. during 
WWII. Although U.S. troops still made up the vast majority of the IAPF, a compromise 
was reached so that a Brazilian general, Hugo Penansco Alvim, was appointed as 
commander with U.S. Army General Bruce Palmer Jr. as his second-in-command.79 
Palmer would remain in charge of the force until Alvim’s arrival on May 29. 
The IAPF performed its peacekeeping mission well, allowing politicians and 
diplomats to negotiate the establishment a provisional government that could organize new 
elections. Negotiations had reached a stalemate between the two factions and a separate 
OAS “Ad Hoc Committee,” led by Ellsworth Bunker helped to clear the impasse. Both 
sides agreed to support a provisional president whose government would oversee the 
organization of new elections. Free elections were held in July of 1966 that resulted in the 
election of Joaquin Balaguer, a conservative and former Trujillo figurehead, over the 
liberal Juan Bosch.80 The IAPF was disbanded following a successful power transition 
between the provisional government and the Balaguer Administration. 
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In the end, the U.S. accomplished its objective of preventing a Castro-Communist 
takeover of the Dominican Republic; however, the Johnson Administration experienced 
significant backlash for its handling of the crisis. Following the U.S. intervention, 
Washington, in a manner prescient of Iraqi WMDs in 2003, struggled to demonstrate to the 
world that there was a legitimate communist faction pulling the strings behind the 
Constitutionalist camp. Washington’s apparent reluctance to reinstate Bosch following the 
uprising drew criticism because U.S. actions appear to have interrupted what many 
considered a legitimate democratic self-correction. Although the IAPF enabled the OAS to 
exercise some control over the conflict’s resolution, the manner of its establishment 
troubled many OAS members. 
B. THE FAIT ACOMPLI 
At the center of the controversial U.S. Intervention was the prospect of Castro-
Communist subversives coopting the Constitutionalist revolution to turn the Dominican 
Republic into another communist outpost on America’s “doorstep.”81 Concerning 
messages emanating from the Ambassador Bennett in Santo Domingo about the 
deteriorating situation and the fear that the Dominican Republic would devolve into 
another Cuba prompted President Johnson to expand U.S. troop presence with the 
deployment of the 82nd Airborne.82 Unfortunately, the U.S. government struggled to 
substantiate these claims, which resulted in indignation from many OAS members as well 
as many American citizens. The concurrent escalation of U.S. military activity in Vietnam 
introduced additional pressure on the Johnson administration to limit intrusiveness but also 
demonstrate resolve against communism so close to home.83 
U.S. fears of communist subversion were not baseless. The Dominican Republic’s 
socio-economic condition, ongoing political instability, and proximity to Cuba made it ripe 
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for social revolution, which at the time would likely have emerged as a communist 
movement. In his memoir, Johnson remarks that he was ‘grateful for the foresight of 
President Kennedy who, sensing trouble, had laid the groundwork” for U.S. military 
readiness in the in the Caribbean.84 The Reid government, which had just been deposed in 
the 1965 crisis, had come to power because the military believed that President Bosch had 
been too soft on communists operating in the country and the Loyalist faction was 
staunchly opposed to his return. Few, besides the Loyalist generals, would actually label 
Bosch a communist; however, his liberal reform platform was attractive to both moderate 
and extreme leftists. Most concerningly, small groups of communist revolutionaries were 
known to exploit political instability like this to obtain power. It is hardly surprising that 
U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers would conclude that the Constitutionalist uprising 
posed an urgent threat to national and hemispheric security. Acting on the advice of the 
country team as well as his advisors, President Johnson ordered in the troops. The initial 
landings were primarily meant to facilitate the evacuation of American citizens; however, 
there was also hope that the Marines would be able to channel the conflict’s outcome by 
“strengthening the will” of the Loyalists faction and encourage negotiation.85 Fear of a 
communist takeover seem to have consumed President Johnson and he quickly transformed 
a limited and justifiable rescue operation into a full-scale intervention with the explicit 
purpose of communist containment.86 
Ironically, there is a good chance that the actions of Ambassador Bennet, who, 
acting on the best information available to him at the time, significantly increased the threat 
of communist takeover by rebuffing the advances of the Constitutionalist’s appointed 
provisional president Francisco Ureña. After being turned away Ureña resigned his 
position to seek political asylum, leaving control of the Constitutionalist movement in the 
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hands of its military commander, Colonel Juan Francisco Caamaño who was surrounded 
by other influential individuals, which may have included suspected communists.87 In 
meetings with Caamaño, U.S. emissary and former ambassador John Barlow Martin, could 
not shake the feeling that Caamaño was unable to speak independently on behalf of the 
Constitutionalist faction, which suggested that he was not fully in control of the movement. 
Meanwhile Martin’s conversations with other trusted sources indicated that known extreme 
leftists, with links to Cuba and the Soviet Union, were operating alongside Caamaño.88  
This provides the best rationalization for U.S. action: that following the departure of Ureña, 
communist actors were able to organize themselves, join the fight on the side of the 
Constitutionalists, and work their way into positions of influence. While these individuals 
were not the ones publicly leading the movement, their influence would have been 
significant enough to tilt the movement toward communist agendas. Alternatively, their 
advice and forces might help to solidify a Constitutionalist victory only to stage a later 
coup to install a communist government. 
Assuming that the communist threat was real, the manner in which the U.S. 
conducted its intervention created significant diplomatic backlash. A small contingent of 
Marines was deployed to Santo Domingo on April 28, two days after the fall of the Reid 
government. This action, which was publicly intended to evacuate American citizens came 
as a surprise to the international community and was frustrating to many OAS member 
states. The rationale given by the U.S. for its actions were that events were moving too 
quickly on the ground to await an OAS resolution. Instead, the U.S. would call a Meeting 
of Foreign ministers to inform the council of the Marine mission the next morning. Dean 
Rusk noted that when Johnson made the decision to send in the Marines it was early 
evening and that it would have been impractical to try and round up all of the ministers in 
the hope of convening a meeting by midnight.89 The initial limited intervention, while still 
controversial, was arguably justifiable in its humanitarian motivation. But, as some critics 
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have pointed out, the OAS has acted quickly in the past, like in response to the Cuban 
Missile crisis, when it resolved to expel Cuba from the organization in just twelve hours.90 
Prior notification of pending U.S. actions, even without formal consultation, would have 
likely created less diplomatic blowback.91 Instead of acting collectively to help resolve the 
ongoing crisis, the U.S. had acted unilaterally without any input making the OAS resolution 
appear to be nothing more than tacit approval of a fait accompli.92 
The existence of Constitutionalist communist leadership remains a mystery; 
however, recordings of President Johnson’s conversations with his advisors throughout the 
crisis suggest that he chose to intervene in spite of scanty evidence to assuage his own fears 
of domestic criticism that would have emerged had he allowed “another Cuba” to occur on 
his watch.93 Critics at the time blamed bad intelligence that was provided by an 
incompetent country team for precipitating the intervention, but it seems that President 
Johnson had also been pressing for intelligence to confirm his suspicions. It was not until 
military momentum had shifted in the direction of the Constitutionalists that Johnson’s 
desire to find evidence of communist involvement “suddenly intensified.”94  
The fait accompli catalyzed the negotiations and the resolution, which created the 
IAPF. For the U.S., an OAS sponsored multinational force would provide domestic and 
international legitimacy to the intervention. For Latin American nations, the IAPF provided 
a means to reduce U.S. troop numbers deployed to the Dominican Republic while 
simultaneously providing oversight and influence over the conflict’s resolution.95 Instead 
of being created to collectively defend against legitimate violent aggression, the IAPF came 
into existence as a means to check Yankee interventionism. The dubious nature of the 
OAS’ vote to bail out the intervention by creating a peacekeeping force was reenforced by 
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the fact that the resolution’s narrow passage required an affirmative vote from the 
Dominican Republic’s delegate, whose government no longer existed.96 From the Latin 
American perspective, the IAPF can be seen as a mechanism for “soft balancing,” which 
in this circumstance came with an uncomfortable requirement to participate in an 
intervention. Considering that the U.S. continued to intervene frequently in Latin American 
affairs over the next forty years suggest that the IAPF was not very effective in this role.97 
But, in 1965 it served its purpose of diluting U.S. unilateralism despite the bad taste that it 
left in the mouths of many OAS members.98 
All members of the OAS could easily agree that the ongoing violence in Santo 
Domingo was tragic; however, violent political upheaval was not that uncommon in Latin 
America at the time. In fact, many of the sitting Latin American governments in 1965 had 
come to power through less-than-democratic and sometimes violent means. As a result, the 
perceived threat from the ongoing Dominican conflict was much lower that the perceived 
threat in the White House.99 Critics of the intervention, including U.S. Senator Fulbright 
argued that by sending troops into Santo Domingo without OAS authorization, the U.S. 
was in direct violation of international law, specifically Articles 15 and 17 of OAS Charter, 
which pledge signatories to nonintervention and guarantee territorial inviolability.100 The 
U.S. could have conducted its intervention legally by calling a Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers to invoke Article 6 of the Rio Treaty with which an affirmative resolution, could 
have authorized the intervention. Instead, the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers had been 
called by Chile under Articles 39 and 40 of the OAS Charter.101 Reasons for avoiding the 
Rio Treaty in this circumstance were based on perceived time constraints and the very real 
possibility that the Organ of Consultation might have resolved against desired U.S. actions. 
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The uncertain nature of communist involvement in the conflict only compounded these 
issues.  
The U.S. came under sharp criticism at home and abroad for the unilateral actions 
taken in response to the Dominican crisis.102 This criticism was exacerbated by the 
Department of Defense and State’s exceptionally poor job of managing their side of the 
story with the press.103 Prior to and during the conflict, the U.S. Government could have 
been more explicit in its support for Bosch. Despite his faults, Ambassador Bennet and the 
Kennedy administration had committed to supporting his freely elected government.104 
Had this support been better publicized, it may have dissuaded the military from ousting 
him in the first place. During the conflict’s early stages, the Johnson Administration failed 
to publicize its outreach efforts to Bosch, which while unsuccessful, contradict the account 
of some scholars like Draper and Lowenthal who claimed that the Johnson Administration 
went out of its way to exclude Bosch from the peace process.105 One of the initial actions 
taken by Johnson, in addition to the landing of Marines, was to dispatch a fact-finding team 
to the Caribbean. This team made a special trip to see Bosch in Puerto Rico only to find 
that he was unwilling to return to the Dominican Republic nor was he able to exercise 
effective control of the constitutionalist movement.106 Bosch’s defeat by Balaguer in the 
1966 elections did nothing to reverse this line of thinking.  
Going against the advice of his advisors Johnson included wording in his speeches 
about “outside influence” before U.S. intelligence could effectively back up his 
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statements.107 This premature admission, and the subsequent publication of inaccurate 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lists of communist operatives served to establish a 
significant “credibility gap” between the press and the Johnson Administration. Other 
instances throughout the conflict served to widen the Johnson Administration’s credibility 
gap. For example, during the initial stages of the intervention, reporters on board U.S. 
warships were able to overhear radio communications between Ambassador Bennett and 
appointed Loyalist leader General Benoit during which the two explicitly discussed levels 
of U.S. military aid and reassurances of success, despite having been previously briefed on 
the Marine’s neutral evacuation-only mission.108 
The credibility gap along with Johnson’s seeming “demonic compulsion… to 
defend the island from communists”109 drowned out the administration’s intent to also 
avoid the rise of another Trujillo style dictator.110 While the goal of avoiding a right-wing 
dictatorship might have been implied under the auspices of the ongoing Alliance for 
Progress, historical (and subsequent) U.S. support for conservative strong men made U.S. 
actions difficult to defend. Once again, the election of former Trujillo crony Joaquin 
Balaguer did not do any favors to counteract this line of skepticism.  
C. OPERATIONAL CONCERNS 
In addition to American troops already in theater, the IAPF consisted of 1,700 Latin 
American personnel from six different nations under the command of a Brazilian Army 
general.111 The injection of multinational troops provided an avenue for the OAS to obtain 
some level of conflict resolution oversight while providing a cover of legitimacy for U.S. 
actions. Although the U.S. removed approximately half of its troops from the theater 
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following the arrival of the Latin troops, American soldiers still made up the preponderance 
of the force. This disparity allowed the U.S. to retain outsized influence over the stability 
operations despite having symbolically handed control to the OAS suggesting that the 
IAPF was little more than a multilateral screen. 
During the IAPF’s formative stages considerable debate took place over whether 
or not the force should be commanded by a U.S. or a Latin American officer. General 
Palmer and Ambassador Bennet, who were already operating in theater prior to the IAPF’s 
conception were adamant that command remain with an American in order to preserve 
freedom of action for U.S. forces during the conflict. Palmer and Bennet were overruled 
by the State Department in order to placate reluctant Latin American partners during the 
OAS negotiation process.112 Interestingly, General Palmer would later write that in his 
opinion, the IAPF would have likely enjoyed wider OAS support had an American 
remained in charge, claiming that the distasteful prospect of having troops subordinate to 
a Brazilian commander dissuaded some countries, particularly Argentina, from committing 
troops to the IAPF.113 The compromise appointed General Palmer as General Alvim’s 
deputy, or second in command, leaving him considerable leeway in organizing the IAPF’s 
leadership to provide himself as much autonomy as possible.114 Ellsworth Bunker even 
went as far to say that U.S. troops were never under the control of anyone except U.S. 
commanders and that the General Alvim’s authority was just “a legalism.”115  
Despite its supposedly neutral and humanitarian pretext the initial stages of the U.S. 
intervention were conducted to bolster the Loyalist faction against a communist takeover. 
The arrival of the 82nd Airborne permitted U.S. troops to isolate the Constitutionalist 
revolutionaries within the city of Santo Domingo by expanding the International Security 
Zone, which was initially established by the Marines a few days earlier. This zone, which 
was sanctioned by the OAS, was specifically designed to place the Constitutionalist forces 
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at a distinct disadvantage.116 When the force transitioned into the IAPF, tactical realities 
did not change and as a result the IAPF struggled to transition its operations to accurately 
reflect its official position of neutrality. The IAPF’s overwhelming numbers and 
commanding tactical position in Santo Domingo almost resulted in them destroying the 
Constitutionalist forces rather than maintaining “an atmosphere of peace and 
conciliation… in the spirit of democratic impartiality.”117 In another instance, which ended 
in his replacement, General Alvim resisted orders to dislodge Loyalist officers who had 
seized Santo Domingo’s primary radio broadcasting facility.118 
The size of the IAPF’s U.S. military contingent, as well as its command 
organization, ensured that U.S. interests, which were more closely aligned with those of 
the Loyalists, would remain paramount. General Alvim along with a number of other IAPF 
commanders were hardline anticommunists who viewed the entire constitutionalist camp 
with suspicion. The 82nd Airborne, which made up the vast majority of the IAPF, out of 
logistical convenience, established its headquarters at the San Isidro Air Base, the 
headquarters of the Loyalist faction, placing its leaders there in direct and daily contact 
with hardline Loyalist leaders like General Wessin y Wessin.119  
It was not until after the Ad Hoc Committee succeed in establishing a provisional 
government under President Hector Garcia Godoy in September that the IAPF could end 
its neutrality charade. Instead of perpetuating the military stalemate, it actively helped to 
solidify the new government by enforcing provisions of the negotiated settlement, which 
included facilitating the departure of belligerent leaders, from both sides, bound for 
diplomatic posts overseas. Most famously, the IAPF organized an “Honor Guard” to escort 
a reluctant General Wessin y Wessin, to his flight out of the country.120 However, the 
damage had been done: the IAPF’s organization and operation confirmed to its skeptics 
that it was little more than a tool for American interventionism. 
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Besides the Brazilian contingent, the other IAPF forces required significant 
logistical support to reach and operate in the Dominican Republic. In addition to 
transportation, the U.S. military was required to feed, house, arm and in some cases, even 
clothe IAPF soldiers.121 The U.S. military was able to meet this extra demand, however, it 
highlighted the logistical realities associated with coalition operations. These difficulties 
undoubtedly helped to perpetuate Department of Defense reluctance to expand beyond 
bilateral military cooperation and simultaneously called into question the effectiveness of 
ongoing bilateral Military Assistance Programs.122 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Dominican crisis in 1965 resulted in the only example of kinetic, multilateral 
security cooperation undertaken by the OAS. The IAPF successfully contained violence 
during the crisis to Santo Domingo, prevented the country from falling into communist 
hands, and prevented the rise of another Trujillo style dictatorship. Troops from seven 
different OAS members operated alongside one another for over a year and yet, the 
experience did not lead to the formalization of any permanent OAS security institution. 
The Johnson Administration terrified of “another Cuba” appearing on its doorstep took 
overwhelming unilateral action, which was potentially in violation of the OAS Charter 
prior to providing notification to the OAS. The perception of U.S. actions worsened as the 
Johnson Administration struggled to substantiate its claims about the communist leadership 
within the revolutionary camp resulting in a “boy who cried wolf” scenario.123 Instead of 
being created to conduct meaningful multilateral peace keeping operations, the IAPF 
became a tool “to make the best of a bad business,” and mitigate American interventionism 
while simultaneously legitimizing it.124  
The IAPF’s overwhelmingly American composition hampered its ability to remain 
truly neutral during the conflict. This was mostly an issue during the conflict’s early stages; 
 
121 Palmer, Intervention, 75; Yates, Power Pack, 148. 
122 Child, Unequal Alliance, 124. 
123 Draper, “The Dominican Crisis.” 
124 Ball, The OAS in Transition, 480. 
35 
however, it helped to confirm the notion that a formal OAS security force would inevitably 
become a U.S. proxy. For the U.S. military, the extra logistics burdens, which the IAPF 
required helped to solidify the preference of bilateral, ad hoc military collaboration with 
Latin partners.  
Depending on the lens used to examine the conflict, the U.S. intervention in the 
Dominican Republic can be either a “qualified success” that saved lives, thwarted 
communism, and achieved lasting political stability or an illegal, distasteful act of 
aggression that did more harm than good. The Dominican Crisis seems like with would 
have been a good candidate to for the application of the Rio Treaty. Unfortunately, it seems 
that U.S. diplomats did not have faith that the treaty’s invocation would provide swift or 
affirmative outcome for U.S. policy. As a result, the IAPF was established during an 
appropriate crisis but for the wrong reasons. What is certain is that the manner in which 
the Dominican intervention took place undermined OAS influence and diminished future 
prospects of formalizing an OAS security institution.  
36 
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III. THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS 
AND THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT 
The war between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falklands/Malvinas 
provides one of the most prominent invocations of the Rio Treaty in which an American 
state came under attack by an extra hemispheric power. And yet, Argentina’s invocation 
of the treaty only elicited rhetorical support from its OAS partners.125 This invocation 
remains controversial to this day because it occurred in anticipation of a strong British 
military response to Argentina’s attempted reconquest of the islands. The OAS failed to 
provide anything but rhetorical support for Argentina’s cause because Argentina’s dubious 
legal grounds for their invasion coupled with the order in which aggressions occurred 
created a situation that tasked the OAS to provide legitimacy to a unilateral fait accompli. 
The Argentine Junta failed to obtain bilateral support from the most powerful and 
regionally important OAS partner, the United States, which ended up actively supporting 
Great Britain and likely tempered the support of other Latin American nations.  
Both Britain and Argentina made efforts to internationalize the conflict in their 
favor. The United States, allied to both parties, became caught in the middle and to the 
consternation of Argentina and most of Latin America it ended up providing significant 
support to the British cause against the wishes of the OAS.126 With only enthusiastic words 
of encouragement from Latin America, Argentina was forced to turn to the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the fringes of the international system to obtain material support for its 
efforts. Meanwhile, Britain enjoyed significant diplomatic support from its European 
Economic Community (EEC) and NATO partners. 
The history, timing, and nationalist feelings involved in the dispute’s history made 
for a fabulously complex diplomatic puzzle. Legal justifications for aggression, 
sovereignty, and self-determination all came into play. However, closer examination of 
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Argentina’s legal justifications for its actions struggle to pass the gut check. Had their case 
for aggression been clearer, it likely would have been able to secure wider international 
support for their cause, which would have provided more fertile conditions for meaningful 
security cooperation under Rio Treaty auspices or not required the treaty’s invocation at 
all. Nonetheless, this case is of extra importance to this study because it represents an 
instance of the Rio Treaty’s misuse. Argentina turned to the Rio Treaty, without the 
expectation of collaborative OAS action, to legitimize its own miscalculation. This instance 
of invocation caused lasting damage to the security pact because Argentina had been the 
first to resort to military aggression and because it highlighted the uncomfortable reality 
that collaborative OAS action through the Rio Treaty seemed to be dependent on U.S. 
support of the initiative in question.  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Ownership arguments of the Falkland Islands date back to the 16th century when 
they were first possibly discovered by either Spanish, English, or Dutch explorers. A 
subsequent visit by a British captain almost a century later put the islands on the map and 
give them a name. French seal hunters would establish the first settlement in 1764 and the 
British would establish a separate settlement shortly thereafter. Spain purchased the islands 
from France in 1767 and then expelled the British settlers living there after learning of their 
presence.127 Spain enjoyed undisputed control of the islands for the next thirty years until 
they were ceded to the newly independent United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata in 1810, 
which would eventually coalesce into the nation of Argentina.128 The fledgling Argentine 
government struggled to administer the islands and in 1833 Britain, at the height of its 
Victorian-Era colonial expansion, would re-annex the islands and establish a permanent 
colony.129 
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Despite a generally positive relationship between the two countries the inhospitable 
islands just a few hundred miles off the coast of Patagonia remained an ever-present affront 
to Argentine national pride. Argentine children are raised on the belief that the islands are 
a long-lost province, held captive, destined one day to be returned to the fatherland.130 
Following WWII, European decolonization was in full swing and in the 1960s Argentina 
began negotiating with Britain to return the islands. Negotiations proved difficult and 
seemed to continuously come up short for various reasons, which included reluctant 
islanders and stiff parliamentary opposition to the transfer. With multiple rounds of 
negotiations failing to find a solution, the United Nations (UN) passed a resolution in 1965 
inviting Britain and Argentina to come to an agreement.131 As negotiations dragged on 
both parties become frustrated with the other. The British became frustrated by Argentine 
unwillingness to compromise in regard to the islander’s rights to self-determination while 
Argentine negotiators felt that Britain’s perpetual domestic opposition to a final settlement 
along with actions that signaled continued British interest in the islands was evidence of 
their bad faith in the negotiation process.132 
Argentina’s military junta, which had deposed the reigning Peronist administration 
in 1976, continued the negotiations with Britain but had quietly decided as early as 1981 
for a hopefully bloodless military takeover if negotiations continued to sputter. Northern 
historical analysis of the conflict suggests multiple theories regarding the Junta’s 
miscalculated decision to invade that range from hubris to incompetence,133 oil rights,134 
and the need for a politically unifying distraction for a populace frustrated by years of 
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repressive rule and a flagging economy.135 Argentine analysis suggests that the Junta’s 
decision to invade was to made gain leverage and jump start the negotiating process.136 
In Britain, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw the implementation of austerity 
measures by the fiscally conservative Thatcher government, which involved the reduction 
of worldwide colonial commitments along with military reorganization designed to fit into 
a larger NATO-centric construct.137 This new British mindset, along with the approaching 
150th anniversary of the British annexation of the Falklands/Malvinas convinced the Junta 
that their opportunity to retake the islands was approaching. Then, a dustup over patriotic 
Argentine scrap metal collectors in South Georgia prematurely set the Junta’s plans in 
motion and on April 2, 1982, Argentine Marines landed on the islands, accepted the 
surrender of the small British garrison and hoisted the Argentine flag over Government 
House in Port Stanley. 
London scrambled to dispatch its fleet as quickly as possible in response to the 
crisis. Indeed, the Falklands/Malvinas and Great Britain sit at opposite ends of the Atlantic 
and during the month that it took British forces to arrive on the scene negotiations began 
in earnest between the two countries aided by the United States, which was eager to avoid 
violence between two important allies.138 These negotiations, as well as subsequent ones 
sponsored by the Peruvian government, broke down following the sinking of the ARA 
Belgrano and Great Britain would eventually expel the Argentine invaders with the full 
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application of its military might.139 The United States, which had publicly maintained its 
neutrality  during negotiations, sided with Britain once the shooting started and provided 
significant military assistance to the consternation of the Argentine government and much 
of the OAS.140 
As the British fleet made its way south, Argentina called a meeting of consultation 
at the OAS and invoked the Rio Treaty in anticipation of an impending act of extra 
hemispheric aggression. The OAS overwhelmingly rallied to Argentina’s side, but the fiery 
rhetoric of many Latin American governments remained just that. The OAS made no 
collective moves to provide strategic aid to Argentina, because “Latins were not ready to 
fight Britain, the United States, or NATO over the Malvinas.”141 In stark contrast, the 
United States and the EEC rallied around Britain offering substantial military assistance 
along with sanctions against Argentina that forced the Junta to seek support at the fringes 
of the international system.142 
B. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT DURING THE CRISIS 
International reaction to the crisis was mixed and support tended to fall along 
geographic and cultural lines. Anglophone nations, most of which had been part of the 
Commonwealth at one point or another, tended to back the British position while most of 
 
139 Following America’s official “tilt” toward Britain, Peruvian President Belaunde offered to take up 
mediation efforts believing that he was influential in Buenos Aires. Belaunde was also eager to be as a 
“prominent peacemaker,” which would bolster his own regime’s stability vis a vis the Peruvian military. 
Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: War and Diplomacy, vol. II 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 274–75, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203507858;  
Peru’s historical territorial rivalry with Chile also made it a more trusted broker in the eyes of 
Argentina. Caspar Weinberger et al., The Falklands Roundtable, Final Edited Transcript, interview by 
Stephen Knott et al., Transcript, May 15, 2003, 35, http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/falklands/transcripts/
falklands_2003_0515.pdf. 
140 Washington adopted a public attitude of neutrality so that it could credibly act as mediator 
between the belligerents and avoid significant Latin American diplomatic backlash. There was also hope 
within the Junta that Washington would support or ignore its invasion as a quid pro quo for Argentina’s 
ongoing military support in Central America. However, following the April 2 invasion Secretary of State 
Haig made it clear to both Thatcher and Galtieri that should the negotiations fail, and hostilities ensue, the 
United States would ultimately side with the British. When Argentina rejected Haig’s last proposal on April 
30, Washington made good on its promise and publicly announced its support for Britain. Alexander M. 
Haig Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan, 1984), 266–93. 
141 Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute, 201. 
142 Gustafson, 192. 
42 
Latin America and other Non-aligned nations sided with Argentina. Both countries turned 
to their respective regional institutions in search of support and legitimacy; however; 
Britain was more successful in obtaining tangible support, as previously noted. Bilateral 
support played a larger role in the conflict outside of the confines of supranational 
institutions with significant military assistance from the United States to Britain and 
smaller offers of material support for Argentina from various sources around the world 
including Israel, Cuba, and Libya.143 
In response to Britain’s moves to retake the islands, Argentina turned to the OAS 
to obtain legitimacy and support from its hemispheric partners. The OAS met on three 
separate occasions throughout the crisis. The first time was on April 13 to consider 
Argentina’s request to invoke the Rio Treaty and the subsequent meetings occurred under 
the auspices of the Rio Treaty’s Organ of Consultation. At each of these meetings the 
majority of the OAS and Rio Treaty signatories expressed support for the Argentine cause 
but went no further than to publish “toothless” resolutions that were ineffective at 
preventing the escalation of hostilities.144 The most notable Rio Treaty signatory to voice 
its opposition to these resolutions was the United States, which was doing its best to remain 
publicly neutral during the faltering negotiating process to maintain credibility as a 
mediator and abstained from each of the votes. It should be noted that Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig was upfront with President Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher about 
Washington’s future support for Britain should negotiations break down.145 Press leaks 
describing American assistance rendered before the official tilt, later confirmed by 
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Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, undermined Haig’s neutrality assertions during 
his rounds of shuttle diplomacy.146 
Some of Argentina’s more enthusiastic supporters were Guatemala and Venezuela, 
which also have lingering territorial disputes with the Great Britain involving Belize and 
Guyana. Nicaragua proved to be a surprising supporter in spite of Argentina’s role in 
ongoing U.S.-backed Central American anticommunist counterinsurgency operations.147 
Other territorially dissatisfied Latin American nations like Ecuador and Bolivia also sided 
with Argentina. 
Not all of Latin America was enthusiastic about Argentina’s invasion but were still 
willing to offer words of encouragement and affirm Argentina’s rights to the island in the 
name of hemispheric solidarity. Some of these concerned countries included Brazil and 
Mexico, whose governments were worried that Argentina’s example would set a bad 
precedent for dispute resolution among hemispheric neighbors.148 Despite these concerns, 
these countries seemed to overcome their reservations and expressed their support, 
especially following the sinking of the ARA Belgrano outside of Britain’s declared 
Maritime Exclusion Zone.149 At one OAS meeting, the Argentine foreign minister’s 
speech, which had called for the application of the Rio Treaty, was received with a 20-
minute standing ovation compared with Alexander Haig’s speech against the resolution, 
which was met with silence.150 
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It should also be noted that at the time, Argentina’s relations with its neighbors 
were less than warm.151 Most notably, Argentina had been on the brink of war with Chile 
only a few years earlier over the control of islands in the Beagle Channel. The dispute had 
been nearly settled with the assistance of the Pope in Chile’s favor; however, suspicion 
between the two nations lingered and these lingering tensions diverted Argentine troops 
away from the Falklands/Malvinas.152 Chile’s official stance on the conflict was neutrality; 
however, a suspicious wreck of British helicopter near Punta Arenas as well as reports of 
British special forces operating in Patagonia suggest otherwise.153 Chile viewed British 
victory in the South Atlantic as in its interest because a victorious Argentina might very 
well shift its momentum back toward the Beagle Channel.154 
While Argentina was not on the best of terms with its neighbors, at the outbreak of 
the Falklands/Malvinas war its relationship with Brazil was improving.155 The two 
military governments had made efforts to work with one another on energy and 
infrastructure projects, which helped to cool the centuries old rivalry between the two 
nations. Brazil did not exactly jump to Argentina’s defense as the British task force closed 
in on the South Atlantic and despite its reservations regarding Argentina’s use of force, it 
did formally acknowledge Argentina’s territorial claim, it denied the British use of its 
airfields, it lent Argentina some military aircraft, and it quietly helped funnel embargoed 
goods to Argentina through some of its ports. In stark contrast with its suspicions about 
Chilean aggression, the Argentine Junta was confident enough in its burgeoning 
relationship with Brazil to use its troops normally stationed along the Brazilian border to 
invade the Falklands/Malvinas. 
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Although Argentina’s invocation of the Rio Treaty succeeded in delivering some 
level of international legitimacy for its actions, the resultant resolution failed to avert 
further military action and failed to halt U.S. military assistance to Britain. Lowell 
Gustafson referred to the resolution’s “lack of organized material opposition to Britain  
[as] … a halfway house between collective security and simple alliance antagonism.”156 It 
is also interesting that despite having called for the Rio Treaty’s invocation, Argentina 
made the practical decision to not press for the adoption any collective military nor 
economic measures in its defense, “knowing that if it had done so, regional support would 
have evaporated.”157 
Toward the top of the Argentine Junta’s list of miscalculations was the reaction of 
the United States. The staunchly anticommunist junta was on good terms with the Reagan 
administration and had previously conducted bilateral security cooperation with the U.S. 
operations in Nicaragua. Surely the Reagan administration would accept Argentina’s 
acquisition of the islands and help talk the British of the ledge in the interest of further 
reducing European influence in the Western Hemisphere. After negotiations broke down, 
not only did the United States not remain neutral, it actively supported British military 
operations to retake the islands.  
Rebuffed by the UN Security Council and with mostly moral support from the 
OAS, Argentina turned toward the Non-Aligned movement for assistance with some 
success. This was an interesting development, considering that Argentina’s staunch 
anticommunist policies and Euro-centric cultural identity, which placed it at odds with the 
Non-aligned Movement writ large.158 Fidel Castro turned out to be one of the most vocal 
supporters of the Argentine position despite having been previously at odds with the 
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Argentine Junta.159 Meanwhile Libya stepped up to supply Argentine forces with Exocet 
missiles that had been embargoed by France.160 
In contrast to the hollow support for the Argentine cause, the British successfully 
obtained the support of the factions that mattered. Previous UN resolutions had encouraged 
Britain to gradually transfer the islands to Argentina; however, after the onset of the crisis 
the UN Security Council resoundingly sided with Britain’s moves to retake their 
territory.161 The United States, in spite of its professed neutrality during negotiations, 
provided strategic assistance since the conflict’s outset.162 American spy satellites had 
their orbits shifted to provide satellite imagery that could be passed along to British 
intelligence. The U.S. military augmented British communications capabilities and 
provided intelligence based on cracked Argentine military codes. Some estimates, “claim 
that 98 percent of intelligence about Argentine movements available to Britain was 
supplied by the U.S.”163 Washington also granted British access to the facilities on 
Ascension Island, which it had leased from Britain, and it made large quantities of fuel and 
missiles available to the Royal Air Force (RAF). It had also been quietly decided in 
Washington, by secretary of defense Weinberger, to make U.S. Navy aircraft carriers 
available to replace British carriers should they be sunk during the conflict.164 Following 
the breakdown of Haig’s mediation efforts , the State Department imposed  sanctions that 
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barred military exports to Argentina and suspended Export-Import Bank credits.165 The 
great irony in all of the measures taken against Argentina was that the United States 
remained in support of a negotiated solution to the conflict, which it knew would require 
the eventual transfer of the island’s sovereignty to Argentina. 
In addition to U.S. support, Britain was able to leverage the cooperation of its 
European partners to sanction Argentina through the EEC. This proved to be an especially 
devastating move as the EEC market accounted for around 30% of Argentine exports and 
halted all European arms shipments to Argentina.166 Despite all of the fierce rhetoric at the 
OAS similar sanctions against Britain and the EEC went unreciprocated.  
C. AGGRESSION AND LEGALITY 
Argentina used its own interpretations of international law justify its invasion of 
the Falklands/Malvinas as well as its subsequent invocation of the Rio Treaty; however, 
these legal interpretations remain unconvincing. In essence, the Junta was asking the rest 
of the world to ignore its own act of aggression and instead only consider Britain’s pending 
act of imperialist aggression disguised as self-defense. The Rio Treaty was so ineffective 
in dealing with this crisis because Argentina’s proposed sequence of aggression was so 
hard to swallow. A myriad of international legal principles surrounds and complicates all 
aspects of this case. Of these principles self-determination and sovereignty are the most 
pervasive, and work at odds with one another.  
Sovereignty is less straight forward than one would assume especially considering 
the different ways in which the territorial ownership is determined between nations. 
International common law methods for establishing territorial ownership hinge on “historic 
claims” as well as “discovery and occupation.”167 Discovery and occupation allows for 
ownership claims to legally develop over time by a claimant’s ability to demonstrate 
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control over the territory through habitation, commercial use, and the continuous exercise 
of state control.168 Claimants will occasionally adopt liberal interpretations of occupation 
by arguing that a region’s ethnic make-up proves historical occupation.169 Britain’s 
possible discovery of the islands as well as its active maintenance of its colony on the 
Falklands/Malvinas legitimized its de facto claim to sovereignty over the course of 150 
years.170 
Historic claims on the other hand rely on documentary evidence along with 
continuous administration to prove the validity of a territorial claim. Documentary 
evidence can take many forms, but treaties are particularly useful in this regard.171 
Argentina’s de jure claims were based on this principle since Spain had acquired them by 
treaty and then transferred their sovereignty to Argentina following independence.172 
Treaties are physical objects and provide a claimant with written evidence of ownership 
with formal international recognition built into them. Unfortunately, paper backed 
territorial claims have frequently struggled to remain binding in an international system 
where might-makes-right. 
Sovereignty negotiations between Britain and Argentina were continuously held up 
on the principle of self-determination. The islanders enjoyed a powerful political lobby in 
Parliament, and they were not particularly enthusiastic about becoming Argentine citizens. 
This “right to self-determination” was the basis Britain’s counter arguments during every 
round of negotiation before and throughout the conflict. The UN’s 1960 adoption of “A 
Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” catalyzed 
the decolonization process worldwide but was written to assist colonized peoples to 
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achieve independence, not force them into control of another foreign power.173 The 
Argentine counters to this line of thought reflected their view that self-determination 
should not apply to the island’s unnatural British inhabitants and that the Argentine 
government would respect the islanders’ “interests” rather than their wishes.174 Successive 
Argentine governments made solid efforts to build positive relations with the islanders in 
spite of periodic declines in Anglo-Argentine relations. Considering how dependent the 
islands are on the Argentine mainland, regardless of the inhabitants’ heritage, it would 
seem that the Islanders’ best “interests” did in fact lay with the restoration of Argentine 
sovereignty.175 
Arbitrated disputes and negotiated resolutions are difficult to enforce in the face of 
strong nationalist sentiment without well empowered supranational institutions. The 
Argentine Junta spent much of its diplomatic energy attempting to justify its use of force 
to settle its territorial dispute with Great Britain. Afterall, according to their accounts, the 
initial act of aggression took place in 1833 and since then multiple international institutions 
had ruled in Argentina’s favor to settle the matter. After its invasion of the Falklands/
Malvinas, the unexpected British response and failed attempts at negotiation forced the 
Junta to seek vindication of its fait accompli through international institutions like the 
United Nations, the Non-aligned movement, and the OAS via the Rio Treaty. International 
support on both sides of the conflict served to further inflame nationalist sentiment and 
closed down diplomatic off ramps on the road to war. 
Argentine foreign relations have historically placed significant trust in the 
applicability of international law. The Falklands/Malvinas crisis, throughout all its stages, 
fits this pattern of excessive legalism. In the decades leading up to 1982, multiple 
international institutions had ruled in favor of Argentina’s claims to the islands. Most 
notably, the Falklands/Malvinas made Britain’s 1946 list of territories, which it pledged to 
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decolonize.176 Subsequent resolutions in the 1960s advanced Argentine expectations and 
officially called for the negotiations to begin. In 1976, the OAS’s Inter-American Juridical 
Committee (IAJC) ruled that ruled that Argentina enjoyed, “an undeniable right of 
sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands.”177 However, as time went on, each round of 
negotiations seemed to fizzle out, and once the Junta decided use force to kickstart the 
negotiating process, Argentina was forced to resort to creative legal interpretations to fit 
its narrative in world forums. For example, UN Security Council Resolution 502, which 
was adopted immediately following the initial invasion called for the cessation of hostilities 
and the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine troops from the islands.178 Most 
interpretations of this resolution recognized its heavy tilt in favor of Britain, and it should 
have prompted Argentina’s removal of its forces. The Argentine interpretation of the 
resolution’s wording was quite different: rather, the resolution did not explicitly label 
Argentina as the aggressor and it set no time requirements for the troop withdrawals. So 
long as the British fleet continued to steam south, Argentina felt that it was under no 
obligation to withdraw its forces and surrender its leverage. 
In addition to truly believing that the British were bluffing, Argentina’s reluctance 
to press for stronger Rio Treaty resolutions suggests that the Junta knew that is legal 
justifications were shaky. The Junta’s interpretation of UN Resolution 502 is also peculiar 
because, although its wording is relatively vague, the use of the word “immediate” would 
seem to provide direct guidance regarding its intended timeframe for the removal all troops 
from the area.179 Even the IAJC’s ruling on Argentina’s rights to the islands was suspect 
considering that the IAJC lacked the legal authority to assess legal territorial claims.180 
A first glance the application of the Rio Treaty to the conflict seems justified. An 
extra hemispheric power was taking steps to use military force against an American state 
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that would threaten that state’s territorial integrity. However, zooming out begs the 
question of where that ‘aggression’ really begins. Argentine accounts of the conflict, which 
shed much light on the Junta’s intentions, struggle to make a convincing case that 
aggression began with the departure of the British task force on April 3, the sinking of the 
Belgrano, nor the recapture of South Georgia. While the British annexation in 1833 was 
surely an act of aggression, it predated both the Inter-American System and the Rio Treaty. 
Argentine sources admit that the April 2 invasion was carried out with peaceful intent to 
catalyze a more serious negotiation process. However, this does not change the fact that 
the Junta ordered the first use of force and initiated hostilities. 
The OAS, acting under the Rio Treaty provided only enthusiastic words of 
encouragement to Argentina’s cause and considering that Argentina did not request 
anything else suggests that the Junta was not particularly interested in material help from 
its neighbors. Instead, the treaty’s invocation served solely to legitimize Argentine actions 
and conceal their strategic failure with evidence of a flagrant example of bullying by a 
declining great power attempting to resist the sweeping tide of decolonization. In all, the 
incident caused significant damage to the Rio Treaty. On one hand, it proved too much of 
Latin America that the United States could not be counted on to honor its commitments to 
the region. This realization was especially damaging considering that the United States 
demonstrated its willingness to entertain European interests over those of its hemispheric 
neighbors. U.S. assistance likely determined the outcome of the conflict in favor of the 
extra hemispheric actor and, “Latin Americans painfully had to see how Washington… 
betrayed the most sacrosanct principles of Panamericanism: collective defense, solidarity, 
and sovereignty.”181 On the other hand, Argentina’s decision to escalate the negotiating 
process made their position a difficult one to support.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In 1982 Argentina invoked the Rio Treaty seeking hemispheric support against an 
impending attack by Great Britain. Since the Rio Treaty’s adoption in 1947, this has been 
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the sole instance of its invocation in response to extra hemispheric armed aggression. And 
yet, the OAS and most of Latin America were unwilling or unable to provide more than 
rhetorical support for Argentina. The United States even acted against the OAS resolutions 
and provided significant strategic aid to the British. This chain of events occurred because 
the Argentine Junta had resorted to force and executed an invasion in an effort to hasten 
the negotiating process for obtaining control of the Falklands/Malvinas. 
Over the course of the conflict both Britain and Argentina looked to allies and 
institutions to support and justify their respective causes. Support largely fell along regional 
and cultural lines; however, Britain was far more successful in obtaining meaningful 
strategic and diplomatic assistance from the United States and Western Europe. 
Meanwhile, Argentina found mostly rhetorical support from its Latin American neighbors 
forcing it to turn towards the fringes of the international system to obtain material support.  
The complex legal arguments surrounding the conflict received vastly different 
interpretations from Latin American and European analysts. However, Argentine 
arguments struggle to justify its invasion and remain unconvincing that Britain had in fact 
been the conflict’s real aggressor. Instead of using the Rio Treaty to rally the hemisphere 
in collective defense it was used to legitimize an ill-timed fait accompli. Argentina 
inappropriately invoked the Rio Treaty after having initiated a military conflict with 
another nation. This invocation caused lasting damage to the security pact because it was 
undertaken without the real expectation of collaborative action and it created a situation 
that forced the United States, the pact’s most powerful member, to openly defy its 
resolutions. This defiance demonstrated that the Rio Treaty could only be counted on if 
collective defense was in Washington’s interest. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite having been invoked on multiple occasions, the Rio Treaty has struggled 
to organize meaningful security cooperation amongst its signatories in response to internal 
and external threats to the hemisphere. Possible explanations for this lack of collective 
action include divergent threat perceptions between Latin America and the United 
States,182 an unusually lopsided alliance structure,183 as well as a relatively stable 
condition of negative peace which exists throughout the hemisphere.184 This thesis and its 
case studies point to another explanation: that over time the Rio Treaty’s salience has been 
eroded through misuse by its members. 
The 1965 Dominican Crisis is significant because it represents the only instance of 
collective military action taken by the OAS. Misapplication comes into play through the 
Rio Treaty’s non invocation. Instead, the United States turned to the OAS Charter in search 
of a collective response. The ad hoc IAPF which was dispatched to the Dominican Republic 
was conceived in order to check U.S. unilateralism and “make the best of a bad business” 
rather than to collectively defend against grave hemispheric threat.185 A more 
straightforward misapplication came seventeen years later when Argentina invoked the Rio 
Treaty after having instigated its own military conflict with Great Britain.  
A common trait that stands out between both the 1965 Dominican Crisis and the 
Falklands/Malvinas War was that both conflicts were initiated in the form of unilateral faits 
accomplish which the United States and Argentina then attempted to legitimize 
retroactively. In the Dominican Republic, the United States landed its first contingent of 
troops prior to informing the OAS, under the justification that American citizens were in 
immediate danger and that the conflict was evolving too quickly to await formal OAS 
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consultation.186 The United States then doubled down by significantly expanding its 
military footprint in the name of communist containment without informing the OAS that 
it was going to do so.187 Instead, the United States turned to the OAS to legitimize it actions 
once 20,000 troops had established themselves in Santo Domingo. The United States 
ultimately got what it wanted; the OAS stepped up and created the IAPF which provided 
international cover for a U.S. guided return to democracy. But, below the surface, the real 
purpose of the IAPF was to blunt U.S. unilateralism, not legitimize it. The way that the 
Dominican Crisis was handled by the United States and the OAS confirmed for many the 
notion that a militarized arm of the OAS would simply become a tool of U.S. foreign 
policy.188 
The Falklands/Malvinas War was the result of Argentina’s attempt at conducting 
its own unilateral fait accompli in the south Atlantic. The Argentine Junta unwisely 
believed that its sudden invasion of the islands would go unchallenged and catalyze stalled 
decolonization negotiations.189 As the British task force closed in on the islands, Argentina 
invoked the Rio Treaty in an attempt to obtain international legitimacy for its actions. 
While Latin America was generally supportive of Argentina and its claim to the islands, 
the case against Great Britain was insufficient to rally a meaningful collective defense 
effort through the OAS. Fully aware that its legal justifications were flimsy, Argentina did 
not push the OAS to take more concrete measures to stop Britain, knowing that if it had, 
much of its international support would have disappeared.190 As the conflict’s initial 
aggressor Argentina’s invocation of the Rio Treaty feels insincere. Ironically, the 
Falklands/Malvinas War could have provided an opportunity to have utilized the IAPF, 
had the Dominican experience not precluded its formalization. During Alexander Haig’s 
rounds of shuttle diplomacy, proposals were considered that included the use of an 
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international peace keeping force to administer the islands and separate the belligerents so 
that the conflict could be deescalated, and negotiations could resume.191 
The circumstances of each fait accompli aside, the two case studies produced 
drastically different results. This night and day variation in OAS response can be partially 
explained by vested U.S. interest in each conflict. Washington’s involvement in the 
Dominican Republic and its desire to internationalize its response made all the difference. 
During the Falklands/Malvinas War, Washington had little interest in which party wound 
up with the disputed territory but was even less interested in taking collective diplomatic 
or military action against its oldest and closest European ally.  
U.S. interventionism around the world during the Cold War was almost exclusively 
carried out in the name of anticommunism. Regardless of whether President Johnson’s 
nightmares about a Castro-Style-Communist Dominican Republic were justified, he felt 
that it was in the best interest of the United States to step in and channel revolutionary 
forces to meet U.S. national security objectives. The United States’ position as a regional 
hegemon gives it the ability to successfully act unilaterally in most situations. Even if the 
IAPF’s establishment was an attempt to blunt that unilateral ability, it does not change the 
fact that the United States had been able to almost will the IAPF into existence. 
Argentina’s prerogatives on the other hand did not outweigh those of Washington’s 
older and arguably more important ally. Washington’s lack of support for the Argentine 
position during the conflict likely tempered the responses of many OAS members to 
contain their support to words instead of actions.192 Not only did the Rio Treaty’s 
invocation fail to avert the conflict, but it also failed to prevent one of its signatories from 
aiding and abetting an extra hemispheric power at the expense of another treaty signatory. 
As the regional hegemon, the United States had the economic, and strategic wherewithal 
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Looking Forward 
The importance of vested U.S. interest creates a dilemma for the OAS and the Rio 
Treaty because if the effectiveness of their conflict resolution mechanisms are largely 
dependent on U.S. security interests then the OAS will continue to come up short until 
either a large enough Latin American coalition forms that can outweigh American interests 
or significant security interest convergence takes place between the United States and its 
hemispheric partners. Divergent security issues have plagued the Inter-American Security 
System for a long time and these divergent interests have contributed to instances of Rio 
Treaty misapplication including both cases examined here. For future collective OAS 
security initiatives to be successful, the United States and Latin America need to reconcile 
more of their security interests or at least find more common ground, a need that is more 
urgent than ever in the new era of great power competition. Without a salient external threat 
this reconciliation will be difficult, and it is not clear that China presents a credible threat 
to Latin American security unless foreign Chinese business practices, like the One Belt 
One Road Initiative, turn out to be predatory in nature and destabilize governments in the 
region.193 Even if Chinese investment does turn out to be predatory the threat that would 
pose to the United States remains questionable. Nonetheless from the American 
perspective, should great power competition turn violent it will be in Washington’s interest 
to have its Latin American neighbors on its side. 
The significant challenge of reconciliation should not prevent OAS members from 
trying to find common ground on hemispheric security. Initiatives to work together on 
smaller, less politically contentious security issues should take place in order to improve 
interoperability and increase interaction. For example, the ongoing fight against 
Transnational Criminal Organizations seems like a good place to start. TCOs are well 
funded and well-armed. Many of them operate paramilitary forces across borders and in 
many remote regions of the hemisphere. They pose significant threats to state control and 
human security in multiple countries. While no country is particularly enthusiastic about 
asking for assistance with its security challenges, it would seem that the pervasiveness of 
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TCOs across the region could provide an opportunity for countries to ask for help instead 
of having help thrust upon them. Conversely, the United States could seek assistance from 
its OAS partners on combatting domestic extremism. The onset of global pandemic in 2020 
also seems like a promising area for collective action that could be taken under Rio Treaty 
auspices. OAS partners should leverage their military logistics networks to accelerate the 
distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.  
One area that needs further clarification is whether the Rio Treaty is an appropriate 
vehicle to effect interventionist regime change. On one hand, efforts at effecting regime 
change during the 20th century did a lot of damage to OAS credibility especially 
considering that most sudden regime changes that took place following the adoption of the 
Rio Treaty occurred with significant U.S. support. This is an especially important question 
considering the ongoing refugee crisis in Venezuela. The sanction regime adopted by the 
Thirtieth Meeting of Foreign Ministers and the departure of Uruguay from the treaty 
suggest that Rio Treaty sponsored intervention remains unwelcome. However, what sets 
the Venezuelan case apart from previous cases is that real motivation to conduct that regime 
change lies more with Venezuela’s neighbors than it does with the United States. The 
Venezuelan crisis is an organic Latin American predicament, and its effects are primarily 
localized to South America and the Caribbean. While the United States would be happy to 
be rid of Maduro, the perceived need to remove him in the manner of Noriega, Castro, or 
Allende has yet to emerge, because it is not clear that his regime represents a credible 
threat. Additionally, previous U.S. experience with implementing interventionist regime 
change may have demonstrated the limits of American coercive capabilities, especially 
short of full-scale military intervention.  
Perhaps the correct answer is that the Rio Treaty should only be used to conduct 
interventionist regime change with the unanimous backing of all signatories. However, 
unanimous consent for intervention would raise the question of whose consent matters, 
especially when intervention is aimed at another signatory.194 Another good area for 
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further study would be effects on treaty salience from departures and non-participation. 
Following the departure of Uruguay in 2019 and the ALBA countries in 2012 only 19 of 
35 OAS members remain at the Rio Treaty table.195 While treaty departures may make a 
nice symbolic gesture, it automatically excludes these states from discussions that might 
seriously impact them in the future. The smaller the pact becomes, the easier it will be for 
consensus to be reached for Rio Treaty action, thus negating the ability of objecting states 
to influence outcomes. 
The Rio Treaty’s repeated misapplication over the second half of the 20th century 
has diminished its relevance by prompting signatory departures and discouraging its 
accession by new OAS members. One positive is that the frequency of the treaty’s 
invocation has decreased but the lingering memories of its use as a vehicle for intervention 
and retroactive cover for unilateralism will continue to plague its future. The year 2022 
will mark the Rio Treaty’s 75th birthday; perhaps it is time for the OAS to revise the treaty 
to meet the changing conditions of the 21st century and hopefully broaden its membership. 
If revision remains out of reach, then continued restraint by all signatories and 
collaboration on less politically contentious threats could help rebuild the Rio Treaty’s 
relevance over time. 
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